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Chapter I
Introduction
Civic participation has always been a critical element in American life.
From cooking clubs to the Common Council, Americans make themselves
part of something more meaningful – at least, numerically – than they are
individually by joining various associations. It is part of the citizens’ First
Amendment right, the constitutional provision that permits people to
“peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances.” While citizens do not only assemble to protest or call on the
government for change, this freedom to associate – in itself – is an intrinsic
part of a democratic government and American livelihood. It is a way to
express views and engage with others, particularly with complex nebulous
structures like the local, state, or federal government. It is a way for citizens to
inform public officials about opinions. It is a way to fraternize with others
who hold similar beliefs. It is part of what determines the laws of the land and
American cultural norms.
Yet in recent years, political apathy has increased and voter turnout has
plummeted. Even during the hyped-up 2008 presidential elections, which
marked the first election of an African-American president and yielded a 64
percent turnout for voting-age citizens, nearly half of survey respondents
agreed that people do not have a say in what the government does, according
to American National Elections Studies. Many citizens are losing confidence
that their voices can make any political impact. This poses a tremendous
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problem for a system of government that relies on citizen participation in the
election of its public officials, to name one issue.
In this paper, I contend that the growing role of money from wealthy
individuals and special interest groups, which contribute to election
campaigns and expect political favors in exchange, has thwarted our
policymaking process. I begin by outlining how 1) civic engagement has been
the bedrock of American democracy and proceed by arguing that 2) the rise of
the corporate state has sparked the downfall of an accountable political system
that is accessible and responsive to all voters. Thereafter, I assert that 3) the
increased influence of corporate money in politics has only magnified this
political flaw. In conclusion, I propose that 4) one effective method for
boosting civic engagement and restoring faith in a democratic government is
campaign finance reform, through which elections would become publicly
financed. This would strengthen a participatory democracy that is responsive
to the average voter, rather than one manipulated by corporate interests that
can donate significantly more to election campaigns than the vast majority of
the American public.

Chapter II
Civic Engagement as the Bedrock of American Democracy

Before I delve into my discussion of the instrumental role civic
engagement plays in American democracy, it is imperative to examine the
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historical roots of the political framework that have fueled this participation in
the United States.
Through what has been characterized as “the most complex constitutional
system in the world,” the American government has been attempting to
balance the tension between democracy and elitism since the 1787
Constitutional Convention, when the structure of an unparalleled political
system emerged, after much bargaining and compromise from the parties
involved. As described by the Framers in Federalist #10,
To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of a
faction, and the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of a popular
government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed.
This system, typified by the Madisonian Model, is based on the separation
of powers, checks and balances, and overlapping centers of political power.
The Madisonian Model aims to balance elite and mass interests, in addition to
regulation and participation of American citizenry. Deliberate institutional
mechanisms, embedded in the Constitution since its ratification in 1789, try to
stabilize these tensions through arrangements like the separation of powers
within different levels of government – between central and state/local
governments, as well as among the three branches of national government –
checks and balances among the executives, legislative and judicial branches,
and the intertwining spheres of political authority. The last of these is most
precisely termed “shared federalism.” 1
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To comprehend why the Framers fashioned the Madisonian Model in the
form it originated, it is essential to briefly address the political and economic
conditions that pervaded the country in the late 18th century. Gaining
independence from the British crown in 1776, Americans, some critics may
argue, took their newly acquired freedom to the extreme at first, much like
people tend to binge on junk food after restrictive diets. The Founders created
a “highly decentralized system, in which the national government derives
limited authority from the states rather than directly from citizens”, embodied
by the Articles of Confederation. As some note, “their suspicion of national
authority very nearly cost the fledgling nation its independence”2. The
newfound confederation assigned so little authority to the central government
– for instance, amendments in direct taxation required unanimous agreement
by states to be effected – that it proved futile in military coordination and
funding during the war with Britain. Thirteen states faced many collective
action problems, such as transaction costs in attempting to manage local
affairs single-handedly and supplying public goods like defense and
commercial markets. Furthermore, there were “contagious levels of free
riding” 3 because the confederation lacked an overarching body of power that
could mandate a tax for all states. Thus, the few states that yielded their share
were exploited by the states that did not, so many states received “free meals”
2
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at the expense of others. When British troops were defeated in Yorktown,
Virginia, with France’s aid, America prevailed in the Revolution but remained
with a declining economy and domestic and international trade barriers due to
a lack of a strong central government. Specifically,
The nation’s shaky finances were not helped by its trade problems, which
also stemmed from the confederation’s explicit reservation of all matters
of commerce to the states … Congress lacked the authority to negotiate
credible trade agreements with other nations. 4

To paraphrase, since the states held the purse strings and there was no
cardinal enforcement device to oblige them to collaborate and contribute, the
states “individually confronted a classic prisoner’s dilemma: No state would
contribute its share of the revenue so long as it suspected one or more of the
other states might not.” This can be linked to the Tragedy of the Commons,
namely the idea that “freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.” 5 To clarify,
the unrestrained freedom the states had eventually drew the entire
confederation into a dire economic situation. Without some control over every
state, all were likely to collapse as they hurt one another through collective
action discords. To boot, because of Congress’ inability to implement
economic policies and regulate commerce in its own nation, it lost the
international credibility needed to compete on a global scale. As a result of
these economic woes, exacerbated by political instability, popular discontent
4
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mounted, culminating in the 1786 Shays’ Rebellion. This rebellion
symbolized the very expression of “excessive democracy” the Framers feared.
Indeed, “Shays’ Rebellion represented a wildfire threatening to sweep the
country into anarchy,” 6and it “mobilized the states behind constitutional
reform.” 7
Now that I have contextualized, I will concisely cover some of the
Framers’ concerns as they crafted the Madisonian Model. Primarily, they were
alarmed by the tyranny of faction. The Framer after whom this model is
named, James Madison, interpreted this principle:
…As a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of
the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of
passion, or of interest, adverse to the right of other citizens, or to the
permanent and aggregate interests of the community. [Federalist #10]
In other words, the Framers were concerned with self-interested groups
that would relentlessly bulldoze their agenda regardless of the repercussions
this might have on the public, even if this infringed on citizen rights or hurt
the welfare of the state. Similarly, Madison stipulated that “measures are too
often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor
party, but by the superior force of … an overbearing majority” [Federalist
#10]. The Framers believed that one of the greatest catalysts of this arbitrary
majority action was a “pure democracy,” which would encourage “popular

p. 61 Kernell, Samuel, Gary Jacobson, and Thad Kousser. The Logic of
American Politics. 4th ed. CQ, 2008. Print.
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American Politics. 4th ed. CQ, 2008. Print.
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passions” to diffuse and eventually interfere with the wellbeing of society. As
Madison observed,
…Such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and
contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or
the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as
they have been violent in their deaths. [Federalist #10].

It is almost as though the Framers were redefining the meaning of
democracy by implying there is more than one kind of democracy. Pushing
for this shift from a direct democracy to a representative one, the Framers
repeatedly stressed that “an encompassing national [republic] would be less
susceptible to the influence of factions than would state governments,” due to
its size and diversity (an auxiliary precaution, with which it becomes more
difficult to organize the tyrannical majority the founders were so apprehensive
of). Another reason for establishing a representative democracy was “to
redefine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of
a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of
their country” [Federalist #10]. Some may contend that this in itself was an
elitist idea that aimed to serve the interests of medium’s occupants, as if
public views need to be filtered by a more refined and well-bred outlooks that
ordinary men lacked.
What’s also noteworthy is that Madison touched on the subject of
property in The Federalist Papers, which bears significance in that the Framers
themselves occupied the propertied privileged class. As some critics explain,
“representing a cross section of the nation’s propertied interests, the framers
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feared the threat which growing democratization posed for their social and
economic livelihood.” Madison seemed to reaffirm this in Federalist #10,
“…the most common and durable source of faction has been the various
unequal distribution of property.” Based on the attention the Framers allocated
toward power and property, the Framers might have been more preoccupied
with keeping their privileged socioeconomic statuses “rather than [satisfying]
the needs of the populace.” Some historians support the argument that “their
goal was to construct a centralized power to serve the expanding interests of
the manufacturing, commercial, land-owning, and financial classes.” Whether
due to the economic conditions permeating the confederation, the historical
circumstances leading up to it, the Framers’ political and economic interests,
their concern with the tyranny of faction, their fear of social unrest, or a
combination of some or all of these factors, the Framers used the Shays’
Rebellion to their advantage: as an opportunity to persuade the AntiFederalists to nationalize the country. 8
We will now take a short aside to outline the institutional mechanisms the
Framers championed for, to further illustrate their endeavor to balance the
tension between elitism and democracy, particularly their attempt to mitigate
the popular passions and tyranny of faction they feared would emerge from an
“uncontrolled” democracy. The founders of the American government clearly
attempted by limitations on their powers of government and by the separation
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of the branches of government, to avoid the “unbridled power of a majority.”
9

These mechanisms include the separation of powers between different levels

of government and checks and balances. Madison and other leading political
thinkers of the time believed that “the accumulation of all powers legislative,
executive, and judiciary in the same hands … may justly be pronounced the
very definition of tyranny” [Federalist #47]. To elucidate further, the Framers
argued that the concentration of all national power in one branch would lead
to corruption, since one leader would retain all control and would not depend
on other branches to thrive and function properly. Therefore, the Framers
were determined in “so contriving the interior structure of the government as
that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, by the means
of keeping each other in their proper places” (another auxiliary precaution)
[Federalist #51].
Resultantly, today the United States has three separate but interrelated
branches of national government, with constitutional provisions that protect
each level from encroachments by others. At the same time, each branch has
leverage over others, so it is in each branch’s interest to cooperate with the
other two. The Framers were arguably most concerned with the connections of
the legislative branch to its constituencies -- out of personal motives, some
counter -- so in the Great Compromise, the resolution produced a bicameral
legislature, with the lower chamber’s representation based on population and
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upper chamber’s representation equal for every state. Overall, Congressional
power heightened after the Constitution was ratified, especially due to the
commerce clause, which permitted Congress to regulate all trade, and the
necessary and proper clause, which “left the door open for a major expansion
of Congress’s legislative power.” 10 To “insulate the executive and judicial
branches and enlist them in containing any efforts by the states through the
Senate to subvert national policy”11, Madison embarked on designing
independent executive and judiciary branches, each equipped with
constitutional means to exercise checks and balances over the other.
Specifically, the executive branch was granted veto power, enabling the
president to nullify any legislative outcome. In turn, Congress is allowed to
override a presidential veto, but only after a supermajority is reached in both
houses (2/3). The Supreme Court is, some suggest, underestimated in its
power – the Constitution grants it the final jurisdiction in resolving differences
between state and national governments, it has the supremacy clause, and ever
since the landmark Marbury v. Madison (1803), it has the right to judicial
review. This authorizes it to overturn any federal laws and executive actions it
deems unconstitutional 12.
But again, some critics offer that the end product of the Constitution – this
Madisonian Model – is an elitist contrivance. For instance, the Framers
67 Kernell, Samuel, Gary Jacobson, and Thad Kousser. The Logic of
American Politics. 4th ed. CQ, 2008. Print.
11 69 Kernell, Samuel, Gary Jacobson, and Thad Kousser. The Logic of
American Politics. 4th ed. CQ, 2008. Print.
12 72-73 Kernell, Samuel, Gary Jacobson, and Thad Kousser. The Logic of
American Politics. 4th ed. CQ, 2008. Print.
10
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evidently did not want to promote amendments to the Constitutions or major
transformations in the government instigated by the general public. As
Madison emphasized in Federalist #49, this would render the government
unstable or untrustworthy, causing disorder in society – or so he eloquently
argued. Others may assert that this was a justification to forge the path for
“rational” leaders and doctrines, while weeding others out as they painted an
illusion of public participation through methods like regular elections.
Whatever the measure of actual impact, the Framers realized from the start it
was important for American citizens – most of whom had fled from
oppression in Europe – at least feel like they have some level of influence in
political life and society at large.
One of the first people who noted this was a visitor to this country. This
19th century Frenchman, Alexis de Tocqueville, was not culturally nor
politically rooted in the United States. During his extended visit, he was able
to critically observe from a safe empirical distance and assess how the
American system of government functions, as an independent observer with
the outlook of an upper class, educated European. Traveling over 3,000 miles
to conduct a “field study” of another nation’s governmental structure for
several months was not a common endeavor at the time, which added to the
singularity of his experience and to the richness of his perspective.
Through features like accidental causes, the laws, and the manners and
customs of the people, America has been able to sustain a balance between
democracy and elitism, according to the French aristocrat and author of
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Democracy in America, a two-volume piece that continues to offer uncannily
accurate and profound insight on American politics and culture to this day.
Tocqueville cited factors like geographic location as one accidental cause,
with its abundance of resources and vastness of land, which by nature fosters
development and expansion of a nation. Furthermore, America was isolated
on an enormous territory, free from competing or enemy states. This meant
that Americans did not have to allot resources to distinguish themselves
through military accomplishments – though we do today – which, according
to Tocqueville, played a significant role in the nation’s motivation. More
precisely, he argued that aggregating political influence in one community by
placing one city above others would cause abuse of power and selfish,
impulsive pursuit of a majority-led agenda. Prioritizing one metropolis over
other towns would also be “a serious injury to the representative system; and
it exposes modern republics to the same defect as the republics of antiquity,”
he contended.
Another favorable circumstance for a representative republic that
Tocqueville found in America was the “equality of condition” everyone was
born with. This was considering an essential component of a functional
democratic republic, which was conceived at the arrival of New England
settlers, who were mostly equal in socioeconomic status. The early settlers left
the laws of inheritance on the shores of England, which rendered it “difficult
for families to preserve their ancestral domains … [compelled] them in some
measure to cooperate with the law.” And equal division of property became
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more widespread, and henceforth “reduced all to one level.” When everyone
begins life in similar economic circumstances, equalization of social condition
occurs and the expectation of equal rights develops. This affects the political
framework, because more citizens expect to participate and fewer anticipate to
solely be governed by others. It is imperative to underscore that to
Tocqueville at the time, equality of condition did not apply to women or
people of color, but to property-owner white males.
Another attribute that helps maintain a democratic republic is the laws of
the land, Tocqueville added. This consists of the federal union, township
institutions, and judicial power, which manage to “check and direct impulses
of the majority without stopping its activity.” Tocqueville listed education as
another “equalizing” factor in the American republic, spreading basic
knowledge and skills to a broad spectrum of people, not just the privileged
aristocracy, as in 18th century France. Education provides greater access to
jobs, avenues for civic engagement, and access to public forums and the press.
This then fosters a sort of practical knowledge and ingenuity Americans
channel into the public sphere, which Tocqueville admired.
One of the overriding dangers of a democratic republic that discomforted
Tocqueville was the unlimited power of the majority. This power is bolstered
by the notion that American people respect the majority, either out of political
virtue – patriotism – or personal interest. The latter essentially means “all
parties are willing to recognize the rights of the majority, because they all
hope at some time to be able to exercise them to their own advantage.” In
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other words, citizens willingly accept the force of a majority and acknowledge
its authority because they believe it will enable them to exercise their own
political will and social agency in the future – a social contract, of sorts. The
turbulence resulting from the transient nature of legislation and the
administration may lead to a tyranny of the majority. It is useful to recall that
to Tocqueville’s immediate readership, democracy mostly equated with
anarchy, and his intellectual quest entailed understanding why democracy in
America works. First, he offered that because legislatures change
representatives annually and the authority of the law is supreme, the
legislatures are injected with an extra dose of power, making them more prone
to abuse it. This reminds us why a balance of power is so crucial among the
branches of government – each department keeps the other in check, thereby
preventing rampant corruption overall (ideally). Another danger of an overly
powerful majority is the impact it has on public opinion, Tocqueville
maintained. As he phrased it, “In America the majority raises formidable
barriers around the liberty of opinion; within the barriers an author may write
what he pleases, but woe to him, if he goes beyond them.” This illustrates that
while there is a relative degree of freedom in thought and expression in
America, there are also restrictions beyond which it is socially expensive to
trespass.
Still, one of Tocqueville’s central observations regarding American
democracy centered on the freedom to form associations – a pivotal way for
Americans to escape the tyranny of the majority. He marveled, at times even
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gently mocked, how Americans have an insatiable inclination to form groups,
organizations, committees – civil associations of all types and sizes – for even
the most trivial purposes. Associations give assent to certain doctrines,
allowing them to be promoted above others in the public sphere. As he
explicated,
In no country in the world has the principle of association been more
successfully used, or applied to a greater multitude of objects, than in
America. Besides the permanent associations, which are established by
law, under the names of townships, cities, and counties, a vast number
of others are formed and maintained by the agency of private
individuals. 13

As the abovementioned quotation illustrates, it is by the people’s own will –
not anyone else’s pressure -- that they form such an array of associations.
Tocqueville reasoned that this tendency to form associations is an
outlet for expression as well as one of the leading safeguards against the
tyranny of the majority, a concept he considered one of the greatest perils for
democratic societies. As he phrased it, “At the present time, the liberty of
association has become a necessary guaranty against the tyranny of the
majority.” Tocqueville asserted that the freedom to associate is not only a
protection but also a necessity for a democratic government, in which the
opinion of the majority prevails and the views of the minority can get eclipsed
without enough prudence. To ground in evidence, “There are no countries in
which associations are more needed, to prevent the despotism of faction or the
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arbitrary power of the prince, than those which are democratically
constituted.” 14
Tocqueville claimed that associations are needed more in democracies
than in monarchies, since in the latter, the minority is not only protected but
reigns absolute. In a democratic society, however, minorities do not have as
much power and find an outlet for their discontents by forming associations.
This bolsters their effectiveness, rendering them visible to those in positions
of power. What they cannot achieve on their own becomes feasible in a group
of like-minded people. Sometimes combining their individual strengths and
efforts toward a mutual goal yields results that exceed citizens’ expectations
about their own capabilities to produce societal change. As Tocqueville stated,
“Citizens who are individually powerless do not very clearly anticipate the
strength which they may acquire by uniting together.” 15 As this connotes,
public associations are integral to a democratic nation, since individuals do
not possess enough resources and clout on their own. Citizens cannot advance
any cause if they do not learn to voluntarily help one another, Tocqueville
contended. Since they cannot force their fellow men to execute a task, citizens
must learn to willingly cooperate for mutual gain.
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Establishing associations remains the minority’s only route toward
budging the status quo, which is why this liberty is so fundamental to prevent
abuses of power by the majority, Tocqueville maintained. To substantiate,
In America, the citizens who form the minority associate, in order,
first, to show their numerical strength, and so to diminish the moral
power of the majority; and, secondly, to stimulate competition, and
thus to discover those arguments which are most fitted to act upon the
majority: for they always entertain hopes of drawing over the majority
to their own side, and then disposing of the supreme power in its
name. 16
As this excerpt stresses, forming associations allows citizens to show the
majority that opposing viewpoints exist and present alternatives to current
conditions. Moreover, they generate the proliferation and competition of
ideas, which enables the minority to select the argument or strategy that offers
the strongest likelihood of coaxing the majority to their side.
By virtue of this behavior, associations acknowledge that they do not
represent the majority, Tocqueville wrote. Suffrage, voting for the majority,
crystallizes this notion and is respected in American society. To exemplify,
many citizens may disapprove of President Barack Obama’s policies, whether
domestic or foreign, but few informed citizens would argue that he does not
hold executive power or that he received this authority illegitimately. He was
the clear winner of a national election, and therefore his post embodies
popular will, or the majority’s stance on the choice of presidential candidate.
In effect, associations, reflecting a minority position, know they are up against
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a bigger tide. After all, if the minority “…did represent the preponderating
power, they would change the law instead of soliciting its reform.” 17
Citizens who join associations realize they must obey the law to
preserve their legal rights and enjoy living in a civil society, which is why
Tocqueville stated, “the right of association may remain unrestrained without
evil consequences” in America. There is widespread public understanding that
while laws constrain liberty to an extent, they also enable citizens to exercise
the prerogatives characteristic of a democratic society – like the freedom to
associate. But these freedoms are only protected if the citizens follow the laws
of the land. The American citizenry realizes it is in every person’s interest to
uphold the laws. More exactly, “The citizen looks upon the fortune of the
public as his own, and he labors for the good of the State, not merely from a
sense of pride or duty, but from what I venture to term cupidity.” He asserted
that in the United States, nearly everyone (again, those who are privileged
enough to vote at the time) exercises the elective franchise, which may shed
light on why the American public feels a sense of ownership toward the laws
and other public goods. 18 Tocqueville concluded that in a participatory
political system like a democracy, governments should not be the only active
powers. Associations ought to stand in lieu of those powerful private
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individuals whom equality of conditions has swept away. To buttress this
concept,
If men are to remain civilized, or to become so, the art of associating
together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the
equality of conditions is increased. 19

Today, however, it remains a question whether the rise of the
corporate state, the subject of the next section, has not brought inequality of
economic and political conditions back – disproportionately tilting in favor of
those in positions of immense wealth.

Chapter III
The Rise of the Corporate State
As Parenti contends in Democracy For the Few, although
governmental decisions are frequently made in the name of national interest,
they rarely benefit everyone those decisions may have an impact on. Defining
public policy proves challenging when only a portion of the electorate makes
key decisions. To support this claim,
A major difficulty that exists within the democratic process regarding
the definition of the public interest is that often very few groups and
individuals participate in the process of defining the public interest in
particular policy areas. The broader electorate does not have the
information, motivation, or time to involve itself in every area of
public policy. 20
19
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In truth, the political system seems to cater to the interests of those
who can exert the most political pressure – something that takes connections
and financial resources to accomplish. To substantiate, “some portion of the
populace, often the majority, loses out. What is considered national policy is
usually the policy of dominant groups strategically located within the political
system.” The political system primarily responds to the influences and needs
of the corporate community, and this section explicates this development in
American history. As Parenti highlights by referencing President Calvin
Coolidge, too often “’the business of government is business.’” 21 Even during
the period of “Jacksonian democracy,” supposedly the era of the common
man, the upper-class dominance of public – often political – that was
characteristic of the founding fathers’ generation I alluded to earlier,
continued into the 19th century and on. As Peter Woll asserts in Public Policy,
“For most of the nineteenth century it would not be an exaggeration to say that
public policy served the economic interests of selected groups in the private
sector.” Specifically, Jackson’s key appointments were mostly picked from
the wealthiest ranks and his policies typically reflected those interests, as
Parenti argues.
Meanwhile, the laboring class of the 19th century – which may be
mirrored in some ways by the middle and working classes today – struggled
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with atrocious working conditions, including long shifts, minimal or belowwage pay, and unsanitary conditions. These intolerable conditions sparked the
railroad, farmers’, and industrial strikes of the 1870s, 1880, and 1890s,
respectively. When the government would step in to respond, “it was almost
invariably on the side of the wealthy element against the working class.” To
be precise, civil authorities would energetically defend the capitalist interests,
crushing workers’ strikes by using measures like the police and state militia
and later federal troops. 22
By the dawn of the Civil War, the law was remodeled to the advantage
of commerce and industry, at the expense of farmers, consumers, workers, and
other groups with less political and economic resources. The law of “eminent
domain,” for example, facilitated the government in seizing farmers’ land and
redistributing it as subsidies to canal and railroad companies.
Like during the 19th century, the affluent men of the 20th century relied
on the central government to do for them what they could not individually,
including: repress democratic forces, limit competition, regulate the market to
their own merit, and in other ways fuel the process of capital accumulation,
Parenti maintains. To illustrate this idea,
During the 1900-1916 period, known as the Progressive Era, federal
price and market regulations in meat packing, food and drugs,
banking, timber, and mining were initiated at the insistence of the
strongest companies within these industries. 23
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As the abovementioned quotation shows, powerful companies within leading
national industries lobbied their interests and aimed to sway federal decisionmaking even back in the dubiously termed “Progressive” Era.
In this period, the several men who occupied the presidency were
faithful collaborators of big business. Teddy Roosevelt’s major legislative
proposals, for instance, echoed corporate interests, as did those of subsequent
presidents like Taft and Wilson. Any legal gains for labor were “wrestled
from fiercely resistant elites by democratic forces after bitter and sometimes
bloody struggle. Even with these victories, the conditions of labor remained
far from good.” 24 To ground in facts, millions of people continued to work
12- to 14-hour days, real wages were lower in 1914 than in the 1890s, and 2
million children -- reported – were still compelled to work to supplement the
family income. One can argue that this can be paralleled to the manner in
which our government today pushes forward policies that may benefit oil
companies but pose grave dangers toward the environment, security, and the
health of the average American.
With the onset of World War I, relations between industry and
government grew more intimate still, after President Woodrow Wilson
revoked the policy of American neutrality in 1915, entering the war allegedly
to “defend American interests” and “to make the world safer for democracy.”
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(This is eerily similar to the patriotic rhetoric utilized by the Bush

administration to legitimize to the American public and the world the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan, some critics may note.) Allied purchases of munitions
and supplies became a major source of profit and industrial production for the
U.S. The war presented the authorities with another justification to strengthen
the oppression of labor. To strengthen this claim,
The war helped quell class conflict at home by focusing people’s
attention on the menace of the ‘barbarian Huns’ of Germany, who
supposedly threatened Anglo-American civilization. Patriotic feelings
ran high as Americans were exhorted to make sacrifices for the war
effort. Strikes were now treated as seditious interference with war
production. 26
Again, this took a toll on ordinary families: in 1916, workers’ wages
could not feed families. About 35,000 were killed on the job every year, with
700,000 suffering injury, blindness, illness or other work-related disabilities.
During the “normalcy” of the 1920s, when prosperity was supposedly within
everyone’s reach, many continued to struggle, Parenti underlined.
When the stock market crashed in 1929, millions plunged into poverty
and economic hardship. The crash exacerbated living conditions for those who
were barely making it as it were. During the Great Depression of the 1930s, a
third of the nation was ill fed, ill-housed, and ill-clothed, with at least another
third barely getting by. Like in the late 19th century, these dire economic
conditions prompted a series of strikes across the country. Eventually, F. D.
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Roosevelt’s New Deal brought some victories for the working class: minimum
wage reform, the eight-hour workday, the right for labor unions to organize,
and the Social Security and unemployment compensation legislation won by
the labor-led coalitions of the 1930s. But as Parenti emphasized, this era was
hardly a triumph for the “forgotten man” – these reforms were rather “giant
stepping stones that put working people on higher ground from which to
continue struggling.” 27 It was not the hardship of millions that instigated this
government assistance and intervention, but the threat of civil unrest that labor
strikes across the nation generated. The corporate state sought to contain class
struggle and calm political unrest, giving “a little to keep a lot,” much like
Tocqueville presciently thought the function free associations would serve to
resist the tyranny of faction.
As Senator Mike Gravel argues in his book, Citizen Power, the
interests of business and government merged further still with World War II
and the onset of the Cold War. They found a common purpose in the nation’s
obsession to prevent the proliferation of communist ideas with the expansion
of our military power and influence aboard. Gravel contends that “true social
progress was being starved to feed the military machine” during this time 28.
But when abuses become very personalized – whether they entail
discrepancies in the distribution of wealth, enlistment in criminal wars like
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Vietnam, or excessive government repression during civil rights movement
and the black revolution – even a highly apolitical public can and does
challenge the power structure. This is a breaking point in the tolerance level of
the masses, when the general public decides to stand up to the power elites to
defend their own rights and needs, Gravel explains. Still, the vast majority of
America’s wealth – and in turn, most policymaking – is owned by these
powerful elites, not a broad middle class that may occasionally channel its
built-up frustrations and discontents in the form of strikes or protests. In fact,
most of the time “middle-income people are finding it increasingly hard to
maintain a middle-class standard of living.” 29
In turn, this “superclass” – as David Rothkopf labels these powerful
elites that steer much of the country’s course – seek to preserve the privileges
they reap from the positions they occupy in our society and are far from
interested in re-examining the way wealth is organized and used in this
country. As Parenti states, “It is corporate power that prevents both a
reordering of our priorities and a move toward a healthier, more equitable
society.” 30 After all, why modify a system that runs so smoothly to advance
one’s agenda? This powerful, wealthy “superclass” is content with the
privileges its occupation comes with. Contradistinctively, the average voter
has become more apathetic and disillusioned with a political process that
consistently disregards his or her voice, the focus of the following section.
37 Parenti, Michael. Democracy for the Few. Fourth ed. New York: St.
Martin's, 1983. Print.
30 38 Parenti, Michael. Democracy for the Few. Fourth ed. New York: St.
Martin's, 1983. Print.

29

26

Chapter IV
Undemocratic Democracy, or How the Increased Corporate Influence in
the Political Process Has Thwarted Accountable Policymaking and
Disengaged the Average Voter

When one feels like one is ignored or one’s input has no effect, he or
she is less inclined to contribute to the conversation – this rationale pertains to
politics and a classroom setting alike. To exemplify, if I get the sense that my
professor does not care about my perspective or even discourages me from
participating in class discussion, I am far less likely to raise my hand and
express my opinion in the lecture hall. In sharp contrast, a professor that
invites students to articulate their opinions on a more equal platform than the
traditional professor-lecturing-students scenario will probably stimulate a
robust exchange of ideas and engagement from his or her pupils. The students
may call for change in the classroom dynamic, offering their takes on various
issues to make the most out of their learning opportunity. But it is up to the
professor to acknowledge and approve of this dynamic shift between students
and faculty, since the professor occupies the leadership role. In this section, I
scrutinize how the ballooning corporate influence in the political process -which stems from the rise of the corporate state -- has thwarted representative
and accountable policymaking, distancing the average American citizen from
active participation in civic life.
When Senator Mike Gravel recounted his travels across the country in
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the ‘70s, he said he saw mounting public dissatisfaction, frustration, and
anger. Americans across the nation were demanding more economic security,
more social benefits and safeguards, more personal freedom, and more control
over the decision-making process, he described. To better visualize,
Sitting in that Harlem street academy in the middle of neglected
America, I could readily understand why the idea of ‘citizen power’
was greeted with contempt when I raised the subject. ... They had only
to look out the window to see a street – their street – littered with
debris, where crime and poverty were daily facts of life. They had no
jobs, no money, nothing to call their own. 31

With the balance of power resting in the hands of the government, business,
and organized labor, the common man has become excluded from the
decision-making process 32. He links this to money – politics have become an
exponentially expensive arena to penetrate. The cards are now in favor of
those who either use personal wealth to become the lawmakers, or those who
donate enough for existing lawmakers and special interest groups to advance
their interests. To substantiate, “Not every important political leader is rich
but many are, and those who are not are usually beholden to moneyed
interests.” 33 Moreover, “Since World War II, almost all presidential
candidates on the Democratic and Republican tickets have been millionaires
either at the time they first campaigned for the office or by the time they
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departed from it.” 34 To add precision, G. William Domhoff underlines in
Who Rules America? that politicians are from the top 10 to 15 percent of the
occupational and income ladders – particularly those who hold the highest
elective offices. 35
Either way, the current framework reinforces the power of those
already powerful economically, and as a result, politically. As Gravel wrote,
“The reliance on personal fortunes or massive contributions from special
interest groups naturally tends to perpetuate in power those who are allied
with corporate and other big-money interests.” 36 To offer more concrete
detail, the cost of conducting a political campaign increased 100 percent over
the past 15 years and skyrocketed 50 percent in just the years between 1964
and 1968 – a 1972 statistic, though the concept may resonate more today than
ever. It cost an average of $5 million to win a Senate seat in 2002. Just since
1989, one sector of the economy – finance, insurance, and real estate sector –
contributed more than $1 billion to federal candidates and political parties. 37
As this suggests, those who cannot afford to run a costly election campaign
will be unable to run for office. In effect, this system excludes citizens who do
not have enough money or do not obtain it from wealthy donors, rendering an
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enormous segment of the population politically silent. Parenti expressed a
similar sentiment: “One of the many ways the ruling class exercises its
influence over the democratic process is by expending large sums of money to
influence elections.” 38
One may wonder what makes elections so expensive, but one only has
to consider the following expenditures to understand the costs involved:
broadcasting, television and radio advertising, professional pollsters,
managers, public relations firms, and advertising companies. All of these
expenditures are necessary to run competitive campaigns, because fellow
political candidates – who may be running for the same office – are sure to
utilize these prevalent communication techniques to boost their chances of
winning over their constituents. Failing to use any of these strategies and
resources is a disadvantage for any politician, because others will. This brings
us to the topic of campaign finance, or how elections are presently run. As
Gravel depicts,
Under the present system of financing of campaigns exclusively from
private funds, the candidate who does not have great personal wealth
must raise the large sums required for a successful campaign by
relying on large contributions or loans from a monied elite composed
of corporate executives and directors, financiers, professional
entertainers, labor leaders, and individuals with family and inherited
wealth. 39
Unsurprisingly, these generous contributors may expect something in return
for their financial contributions. As Parenti somewhat sarcastically puts it,
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If it should happen, however, that after the election the big contributor
finds himself or his firm burdened by a problem that only the White
House can handle, he sees no reason why he shouldn’t be allowed to
exercise his right like any other citizen and ask his elected
representative, who in this case happens to be his friend, the president
of the United States, for a little help. 40

Like most business transactions, the wealthy donors perceive these
contributions as investments, for which they should benefit after the fact.
More often than not, that is precisely what takes place – elected officials end
up listening to and responding to the interests of these affluent contributors
much more readily than “Joe the Plumber” who donates $10 toward a given
political campaign. As a result, “What they want, and what they usually get,
are elected officials who are beholden to them and inclined to be sympathetic
and responsive to their interests and needs.” 41 For example, the Nixon
administration helped settle a multibillion-dollar antitrust suit against ITT in
return for a $400,000 donation. Furthermore, one of President Reagan’s first
acts involved deregulating heating oil and gasoline prices – a $50 billion
“gift” to the oil companies in return for more than $200 million they
contributed to his 1980 campaign. What this demonstrates is a political
structure built on financial base, either personal or acquired for a hefty
economic and political price.
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It is not surprising, then, that many voters now view elections as an
elaborate theatrical circus, in which they are growing tired of the quality of the
candidates, the lack of real choice, the absence of real issues, the numerous
primaries, and the “vast expenditures of campaign funds.” 42 Ever since the
1974 Federal Election Campaign Act, supported by court decisions and
Federal Election Campaign rulings, corporations have been given the green
light to form political action committees (PACs) that can solicit contributions
from stockholders and company employees – from managers on down – and
can spend as much as they wish on their preferred candidates 43. This spurred
an explosion of corporate PACs: 776 in 1978, 954 in 1980, and 1327 in 1982 - “and a dramatic increase in big-business contributions.” 44
Some may think only corrupt politicians are susceptible to this
influence, but one only has to look at the pervasive nature of money in politics
to acknowledge this is far from reality. “’Everyone has a price,’ Howard
Hughes once told an associate who later recalled that the billionaire handed
out about $400,000 yearly” to councilmen, county supervisors, tax assessors,
sheriffs, state senators, assemblymen, district attorneys, governors,
congressmen and senators, judges, and even vice-presidents and presidents in
the late 1970s . To phrase otherwise,
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The temptation for corporate interests to use large sums of money to
win decisions that bring in vastly larger sums is strong…especially
since those who would be the guardians of the law themselves have
their palms out or are in other ways beholden to the corrupting powers.
Politicians too face a competitive market, and their campaign expenses
are burdensome. To avoid yielding to the special interests, to refuse to
take from the haves, is to turn oneself into a have-not and lower one’s
chances of political survival. 45

Corporate money seems to have become an elementary part of politics, and to
refuse it without drastically restructuring the current system of election
financing may well equate to political suicide.
Many large corporations now have special departments dedicated to
performing favors for office holders. It may shock some, but “the services
include everything from free Caribbean trips on private jet planes to loans,
private contracts, and illegal gifts.” 46 The American Petroleum Institute -- an
organization of gas, oil, and petrochemical companies -- allocates $75 million
annually in lobbying efforts in Washington and has at least a dozen full-time
lobbyists. In 1979, the oil industry employed over 600 people to lobby
Congress and government agencies. Money is paramount for lobbying
lawmakers. As one House aide said, money purchases ‘basic ingredient of all
lobbying’ – accessibility to the officeholder and, with that, the opportunity to
shape his or her judgments with arguments of the lobbyist’s own choosing.” 47
Most of the public may have no idea what their state representative are doing,
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but banks, land developers, utilities, and manufacturers regularly
communicate with them, inundating them with campaign contributions, legal
retainers, special-term “loans,” and investment advice. To solidify this
concept,
Congress produces an array of grants, subsidies, leases, franchises,
inkind supports, direct services, noncompetitive contracts, loan
guarantees, loss compensations, and other forms of public largesse to
private business…that same Congress cut food programs for infants
and senior citizens, assistance programs for the disabled, home-care
and therapy programs for the inform and handicapped, and medical
care, job, and housing programs for the poor and elderly. 48
Subservience to business is so widespread, that it is sometimes difficult to
distinguish the politicians from the lobbyists. 49
As a result of this corporate grip on politics, then, we have been seeing
“decline in party apparatus, an increase in free-for-all primary contests, and an
ever greater dependency on big contributors to pay for individualized staffs
and costly media campaigns.” 50Since money is needed to run election
campaigns, a process all officeholders undergo, campaign finance is not – or
should not be – a partisan issue. Both parties tend to ‘”reflect an upper-class
tendency,’ not surprisingly, since ordinary working people rarely have the
time and money that would enable them to participate.” 51 Gravel contends
that this results in the very public disenchantment that has alienated many
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American citizens from civic life, “The growing disaffection with the political
process can be traced directly to the powerlessness of our people, the
unresponsiveness of our parties, and the increasing control of our lives by a
monied elite.” 52 In the last section of this paper, I offer some solutions to this
pressing issue, basing my convictions on secondary research and two years of
experience as an intern for nonprofit organization Democracy Matters.

Chapter V
Solutions: Campaign Finance Reform and Political Youth Activism
In the 2010 landmark Citizens United ruling, the Supreme Court held
that corporations are legal entities that deserve the same First Amendment
protections as private citizens in relation to political speech, in the form of
financial contributions to political campaigns. Justice Anthony Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court:
We find no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political
speech, the government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored
speakers," he wrote. "The court has recognized that First Amendment
protection extends to corporations.
This decision, approved by a 5-4 margin, blurred the distinction
between corporate and individual spending, overturning a 22-year-old
Supreme Court decision that barred corporations from spending unlimited
financial resources to support or oppose candidates. Furthermore, it nullified
part of the 2002 McCain-Feingold campaign finance law that prohibited
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political advertisements financed by corporations or unions from being
broadcast or transmitted 30 days before a presidential primary and 60 days
before the general election. Some limitations remain. For example,
corporations still cannot contribute directly to federal candidates or national
party committees, a ban that dates to 1907. Other restrictions, including
disclosure requirements for nonprofit organizations that champion for political
candidates, still apply. But overall, by striking down limits on expenditures by
corporations that are not formally associated with candidates’ campaigns, the
court effectively aggrandized the role of special interests in politics, many
critics and government watchdog groups believe. One of the first critics to
denounce this ruling was President Obama, who said in an official statement:
The Supreme Court has given a green light to a new stampede of
special interest money in our politics … It is a major victory for big
oil, Wall Street banks, health insurance companies and the other
powerful interests that marshal their power every day in Washington to
drown out the voices of everyday Americans. 53
Like Hankin points out in Making Democracy Work, “A corporation
differs from an individual in that, as one wag has put it, ‘it has no body to be
kicked and no soul to be damned.’ But the law finds it convenient to deal with
it as a person – though a fictitious one – in many ways.” 54 In actuality, it is
quite simple to discern that a corporation differs from an individual citizen in
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countless ways, beginning with the fact that most Americans do not stand
behind a comparable network of powerful connections and financial resources
that a corporation does. It logically seems inequitable, then, to extend the
same legal prerogatives to an already powerful entity while indirectly
reducing the potential of the average voter to exercise his or her political
voice. This only works to institutionalize the existing political and economic
inequalities in American society, limiting the very concept of public interest.
As Woll remarked in the 1970s,
If more of the public at large could be involved in the process of policy
formulation then the public interest would be defined differently. But
so far the mechanisms of our democracy have not been able to bring
wider public participation into the process of policy formulation. 55
One viable alternative to the status quo is campaign finance reform,
today most comprehensively embodied by the Fair Elections Now Act, a bill
co-sponsored by Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin. This piece of
legislation seeks to enable candidates to choose to run for congressional office
without relying on large contributions, big money bundlers, or donations from
lobbyists. Senator Gravel observed over four decades ago that, “We have to
democratize our elections, and we can do this only if we provide federal
subsidies for both presidential and congressional election campaigns.” 56 As
this quotation denotes, one vehicle for this potential change is the public
financing of election campaigns, otherwise known as “clean elections” or “fair
elections.” This reform is a primary and necessary step in returning control of
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the government to the people, and it is the only method to halt the auctioning
of American elections to the highest private bidder, as Gravel underscores:

A people’s platform, therefore, must insist on the public financing of
elections to help ensure that our elected officials are not unduly
inhibited or excessively influenced by the real and imagined
obligations which accompany large private campaign contributions. 57
Under this voluntary system, qualified candidates could received
donations of $100 or less, with would be matched by government funds. This
way, ordinary Americans can run for office without leaning on wealthy
special interests to enter – and win – a political race. Instead, candidates
would be able to organize grassroots campaigns and spend a larger chunk of
their time on the campaign trail communicating with their constituents, rather
than “dialing for dollars.” Importantly, public financing would permit average
voters to connect with politicians and express their perspectives. The playing
field of politics could also be levelled, allowing more diverse candidates in,
thereby enriching the scope of the competition and choice for voters.
Uncontested elections would be less frequent, more challengers and diverse
candidates would enter the political scence, and together this would present
voters with more choice and incentive to participate in civic life. Conjointly,
this would restore public confidence in the electoral system, because voters
would appreciate that elected officials are more responsive and accountable to
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their needs, rather that strangled by the corporate stronghold. 58

Public financing schemes have proven to work effectively. This is
evident in states like Maine, Arizona and Connecticut. Specifically, in 2006,
Arizona elected "clean" candidates as Governor, Lieutenant Governor,
Attorney General, and other state-wide offices. Voter turnout rose from 64
percent in 1996 to 77 percent in 2004. The number of Native American and
Latino candidates also tripled between 2000 and 2002. In Maine, 85 percent of
the seats in the state legislature in 2008 were occupied by candidates who ran
with public financing – owing their allegiance to nobody except their
constituents. An attractive element in this turbulent economic climate is that
public financing of all state elections has not cost taxpayers any money. The
system is mostly funded by a levy on criminal and civil penalties, and
voluntary contributions. In reality, taxpayers would save money if politicians
were not sponsored by special interests in return for tax breaks, special favors,
and government bailouts. The Democracy Matters Institute estimates that
public financing at the federal level would cost taxpayers less than $10 -- a
negligent price to pay for a more representative and robust democracy. 59
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The impact of involving young people in this cause and political life
generally cannot be underestimated, a claim I can attest to thanks to my
experience of interning with Democracy Matters and serving as the president
and founder of the Syracuse University chapter of this nonprofit organization
for the past two years. Whether by initiating and coordinating a 55-student trip
to the Washington, D.C., rallies in October of 2010, organizing a lobby visit to
State Senator Valesky, or by penning letters to Governor Andrew Cuomo, I
have seen with my own eyes that grassroots campaigns can mobilize students
and even elicit response from elected officials. This bipartisan organization
advocates reducing corporate influence in politics by involving college
students in politics, unveiling a platform for students of all interests and
concerns to relate on. Established by Colgate University student and NBA
player Adonal Foyle in 2001 to give students a bigger voice on important
issues, this organization rallies for the public financing of elections across the
country, to fight the corporate takeover of democracy in America. The
mobilization of citizenry is instrumental in enacting any change in American
society, a time-tested reality our history books reveal when summarizing the
course of events of civic rights movements, for instance. It is a force of great
potential magnitude, and it can be tapped into by sacrificing some of your
time and effort toward advancing a more participatory system of government
– the lifeblood of American democracy we have the obligation to sustain.
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